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THE ATTEMPT TO  REPEAL MAINE’S 
PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS
Many issues divided the nation before the Civil 
War. One in particular involved the passage of Per­
sonal Liberty laws in the northern states, which circum­
scribed the conduct of officials handlingfugitive slaves. 
While Maine was not a prominent destination for 
runaway slaves, its Personal Liberty laws, redrafted in 
1857 by the state's new Republican majority, were 
particularly forceful and therefore particularly odious 
to Southern planters. As the secession crisis loomed, 
Maine reconsidered the constitutionality of the laws 
and their political expediency: Would the state bend to 
the needs of national reconciliation? Mr. Desmond, 
born in Island Falls, Maine, received M.A. degrees in 
education (1979) and History (1991) from the Uni­
versity of Maine and taught for twelve years in Maine 
public schools. He has published several articles (NEW  
ENGLAND QUARTERLY, TENNESSEE HISTORI­
CAL Q U A R TE R LY , C H A T T A N O O G A  R E ­
GIONAL HISTORICAL JOURNAL), and a book: 
IMAGES OF AMERICA: CHATTANOOGA. A resi­
dent of Lookout Mountain, Georgia he is currently 
employed as Curator of Collections for the Chatta­
nooga Regional History Museum .
JERRY R. DESMOND
Following the election o f Abraham  Lincoln in I860, it 
becam e evident to m oderates in both the Republican and 
Democratic parties that concessions to the South were necessary 
to avoid secession and civil war. O ne issue that seemed prom is­
ing in this regard was the possible repeal of the various Personal
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The issue of how runaway slaves were to be handled in the North sparked a legal crisis 
in the 1850s involving questions of propertv rights and personal libertv. The controversy 
brought into question the federal Fugitive Slave Law, the Personal Libertv laws passed 
by northern states, and indeed the Constitution itself. Solomon Northu/), TWELVE YEARS 
A SLAVE (1853).
Liberty laws passed in the North during the 1850s. As a state 
clearly controlled by the Republican party, dem onstrated by the 
huge majority of votes given to Lincoln in the November 
election, Maine held the unique position o f having the opportu ­
nity to send a message of conciliation to the South bv repealing 
its Personal Liberty laws. Instead, the state legislature, in concert 
with the State Suprem e Judicial Court, turned its back on 
com prom ise, voting to retain its the laws in the face of the 
possible destruction of the Union. The sequenceof events which 
led to this decision are the subject of this article.
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O ne of the m ost troublesom e issues of the 1850s was the 
continuing problem  of runaway slaves. It is not possible to give 
an exact total o f the num ber of runaways in the decade prior to 
the Civil War, b u t 1,000 a year is the m ost com m on estimate. In 
1850, 1,011 runaways were reported; in 1860 the total tallied 
803.1 If these two years were typical, which may no t be true, it 
would be possible to estimate that a total o f approximately 9,000 
slaves ran away in the 1850s, from  a total slave population of 
between 3.2 million in 1850 and 3.9 million in 1860. Thus an 
estim ated .23 percent, or 1 slave out of 439, were runaways. 
Certainly Southern estimates o f these num bers were greater. 
J.F.H. C laiborne’s estimate of 100,000 in 1860 over the previous 
fifty years represented  obviously a guess.2
Regardless o f these totals, the idea that slaves were escaping 
to the N orth  rankled the Southerners. They wanted those slaves 
back, and thus needed to establish procedures for their recovery. 
In 1787, during the Constitutional Convention, a compromise 
on the fugitive slave question was reached and written into 
Article IV of the Constitution. W ithout actually m entioning the 
word slavery, the article stated that “no person held to Service or 
L abour” who escapes to another state shall be considered free 
and m ust be ‘'delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.” H erein lay the basic problem  of 
the fugitive slave question: ambiguity. If the founders had been 
m ore specific in the phrasing of this section of the Constitution, 
the next seventy-three years would have been less disputatious. 
Only a few carefully chosen words about who would enforce the 
guarantees provided for in this section — the states or the federal 
governm ent — were needed. If the wise m en in Philadelphia 
in tended that the m aster could recover his property by himself, 
by his own means, they certainly did not explain this in the 
Constitution. As it was, six years later in 1793, Congress 
attem pted to define this section with the first Fugitive Slave Law.
The 1793 law seemed, on the surface, to provide definitive 
answers to the questions o f procedure and jurisdiction. It 
established uniform  extradition procedures between states, p ro­
vided a $500 fine for anyone who obstructed an owner, or his
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agent, or concealed a runaway. Clearly it em powered the slave 
owner or his agent to “seize or arrest such fugitive from  labour, 
and take him before a federal judge within the state, or before 
any magistrate of a county, city, or town corporate where the 
seizure was m ade.”:i After the owner proved to the satisfaction 
of the official that the person was a runaway, the slave could be 
retu rned  and restored to the owner.
However clear these procedures were, many im portant 
questions rem ained unanswered. Could the state or local magis­
trate refuse to provide assistance to the slave owner or his agent? 
W ould such an action be considered obstruction and, thus, 
subject the official to a possible fine of $500? W ere the state or 
local officials required to assist in locating and capturing the 
alleged runaways? W ould the accused runaways be allowed to 
speak at a hearing, provide for their own defense, submit 
evidence contrary to the charge, or have witnesses speak in their 
behalf?
Obviously, Southerners believed that the owner had the 
right to recapture his property or to have that property delivered 
by professional agents. Many N ortherners, in contrast, believed 
that they had the obligation to protect the rights of citizens — and 
others — within their state boundaries. Thus, in one o f the great 
ironies of the fugitive slave issue, the Southern states, defenders 
of states’ rights, yielded to the federal governm ent the power to 
enforce the law — in fact, insisted that it do so. The N orthern  
states, m ore inclined towards federalism, began to pass statutes, 
known as Personal Liberty laws, to protect the states from  federal 
encroachm ent upon the rights of their citizens.
In the early nineteenth century New York and Pennsyl­vania took the lead in passing Personal Liberty laws which restricted the state’s role in enforcing the Fugi­
tive Slave Law of 1793, including acts to prevent the kidnapping 
o f free people of color and certain guarantees o f due process. 
Maine, after statehood in 1820, enacted several such laws, 
including “An Act for the protection of the Personal Liberty of 
the Citizens, and for o ther purposes” in 1821, “An Act establish­
ing the Rights to the W rit for replevying a person” in 1821, and
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“An Act against kidnapping or selling for a slave” in 1838.4 By 
the later date, most of the N orthern  states had some sort of 
Personal Liberty law am ong their statutes. This fact, along with 
an alarm ing increase in the num ber of fugitive slaves and a 
growing agitation by N orthern  abolitionists, led the South to 
challenge these laws in the federal courts.
In the m ost im portant of these cases, Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
(1842), a grand ju ry  in Pennsylvania indicted Edward Prigg for 
kidnapping certain alleged runaways in 1837. At issue was the 
right of a m aster "to reclaim and remove his property from  a free 
state w ithout a recourse to the courts.”5 The N orthern  view held 
that the state had the right to grant ajury  trial, under the laws of 
Pennsylvania, to the alleged runaways. The court decided 
unanim ously that the national governm ent had exclusive power 
of legislation upon  the question of fugitive slaves and that the 
Pennsylvania law upon which Prigg had been indicted was 
unconstitutional. O ne judge, John  McLean of Ohio, while 
concurring with the majority, wrestled with two fundam ental 
propositions: First, while adm itting that slaves were property, 
Justice McLean questioned the right of a m aster to remove the 
alleged runaway without p roof of right or ownership. “Is this not 
an act which a state may prohibit?” he asked.6 Second, if the 
ow ner’s claims were not just, how could his act of force be 
rem edied?
Events following Prigg could hardly have pleased the South. 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Ohio, New Jer* 
sey, and V erm ont passed laws similar to the Pennsylvania law 
declared unconstitutional by the Suprem e Court. Pennsylvania, 
New York, and Maine refused to drop their Personal Liberty laws 
from  their statutes, justifying their nullification of Supreme 
C ourt edicts with talk of “a higher law.” This issue, coupled with 
the disputes over the expansion of slavery into the new territories 
won in war from  Mexico and the proposed adm ittance of 
California to statehood, led to the Com prom ise of 1850 and a 
new Fugitive Slave Law.
The Com prom ise of 1850 was in reality a very complex 
series of m aneuverings in Congress. Both sides, as in most
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compromises, gave in on key issues in o rder to reach an agree­
m ent, and neither was completely happy with the outcome. The 
Fugitive Slave Act o f 1850, as a section of the seven-part com pro­
mise, was w ritten from  the Southern viewpoint. This was done 
to reward the South for relenting on the adm ittance o f California 
as a free state and for agreeing to end the slave trade in 
W ashington, D.C. The act had several controversial sections, 
including a provision that allowed commissioners to sum m on 
the aid of bystanders in catching runaways, a provision that 
subjected those helping runaways to a $1,000 fine and a six- 
m onth jail term , and a provision that disallowed the right o f the 
alleged runaway to testify at hearings. Certainly, the m ost contro­
versial provision paid ten dollars to commissioners who found in 
favor of the claimant and only five dollars to those who found in 
favor of the alleged runaway.7
T he howl that went up in the N orth following the passage o f the Fugitive Slave Act has scarcely been m atched in the country’s history, and never, except 
perhaps during the actual secession of Southern states in 1860- 
1861, have so many state governments ignored or passed laws to 
circumvent a federal statute. Only during Prohibition have so 
many Americans purposely broken a law of the country. In a 
flurry o f activity, several N orthern  states actually strengthened 
their Personal Liberty laws. Wisconsin went so far as to declare 
the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional. Almost weekly, stories 
of the “kidnapping” of black m en and women or the “heroism ” 
of those who resisted the new law found their way into N orthern  
newspapers. Shadrach Wilkins and Anthony Burns in Boston, 
William H enry in Syracuse, Joshua Glover in Milwaukee, and 
John  Price in O berlin were the m ore notable examples o f these.
While there were no such celebrated cases in Maine, 
probably because the state was somewhat off the track of the 
U nderground Railroad, the Maine legislature did strengthen its 
Personal Liberty laws in 1855.8 There can be no doubt that these 
revisions were in tended to circumvent the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850. Entitled “An Act Further to Protect Personal Liberty,” the 
new statute prohibited judges, sheriffs, jailers, and o ther state
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officials from  assisting in the capture or detention of alleged 
runaway slaves or granting certificates of removal. The fine for 
such actions was up to $1,000 and a possible one year jail term .9 
Federal marshals, however, could execute the provisions of the 
Fugitive Slave Act without hindrance or obstruction.
In 1857, during a general revision o f all o f the Maine 
Statutes the Personal Liberty laws were rewritten and strength­
ened, making them am ong the most potent in the country. No 
retreat in the 1857 statutes occurred, and coming as they did on 
the heels o f the Dred Scott decision in March 1857, there is little
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surprise in this fact. The new provisions required that the district 
attorneys o f each county provide legal assistance in fugitive slave 
cases, all costs to be paid by the state. Jail keepers in Maine were 
no t allowed to hold persons claimed as fugitive slaves, and 
municipal judges were not allowed to hear fugitive slave cases. 
The Maine legislature, controlled by the new Republican major­
ity, overwhelmingly endorsed these revisions.10
“The surrender o f a hum an being, ” the New Y ork Evening 
Post com m ented bitterly, “who has exhibited his fitness for 
freedom  by encountering the dangers of escaping from  slavery, 
is a m ost repulsive task.”11 In Maine, such a task would not be 
perform ed w ithout first applying due process. A slave owner 
would find it impossible to recover a runaway in Maine. His only 
recourse was to employ the offices o f the federal marshal in 
Maine. The slave owner or his agent would be lucky to escape the 
state unharm ed, as the provisions of the statute seem ed to imply 
that Maine would not punish “affrayers, rioters, or breakers of 
the peace” in any cases related to a fugitive slave.
To Southerners these statutes were clearly unconstitu­
tional. More importantly, however, it seemed to the South that 
the N orthern  states were reneging on the com promises reached 
in 1787 and the Com promise of 1850 — compromises in which 
the South had surrendered a great deal. If the N orth backed 
away from  these, it would certainly be read as an act of nullifica­
tion, endangering the Union; any talk of Southern secession 
would only occur after the fact. A central campaign issue of the 
election of 1860 became the Southern dem and that the Personal 
Liberty laws in the N orth be repealed; Lincoln’s election seem ed 
to end all hopes o f effecting that repeal.
However, some Republicans were disturbed by the charges 
o f the unconstitutionality. Now that their candidate had been 
elected and Republican majorities established in Congress, 
perhaps some sort o f gesture towards the South would be in 
order: if no t repeal, as least a prom ise to look into the issue of 
constitutionality.
Democratic newspapers in Maine, o f course, insisted that 
repeal should be the prim e option. Appealing to “all conserva­
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tive m en in the republican ranks, ” the editors o f the Eastern Argus 
wrote in N ovem ber 1860: “Their enactm ent was a departure 
from  national good faith, and every State guilty of it, is bound  in 
honor to repeal them  and thus place themselves right before the 
county.”12 The Argus also gave a compelling political reason for 
repeal: “Such a course would have a decided effect to allay 
excitem ent in the South and would very much strengthen Mr. 
Lincoln’s hands in m eeting the revolutionary m ovem ents.”13 
The Machais Union also called for repeal, stating that “a m ore 
deliberate use o f nullification was never heard  of....Is there any 
w onder that the South has come to the conclusion that the 
N orthern  States are not friendly to them ?”14
N one of the Republican journals in the state actually came 
out in favor o f repeal. The three largest and most influential of 
these, the Bangor Whig and Courier, the Kennebec Journal, and the 
Portland Daily Advertiser, all violently opposed such a policy. “As 
usual, the evil which the South is supposed to endure in conse­
quence of the existence of personal liberty laws,” wrote the Daily 
Advertiser editor, “have been very much exaggerated.”15 W hen 
presented with the possibility that the repeal would help ease 
tensions between the sections, the Whig and Courier editor asked 
“if there be any person who thinks that the repeal of the personal 
liberty laws by N orthern  States would ‘satisfy the South’?”16 The 
Kennebec Journal rem inded Maine citizens that the Personal 
Liberty laws pro tected  the rights of trial by ju ry  and the writ of 
Habeas Corpus. “Can Maine do less, and preserve her honor?”17 
O f all the Republican journals, only the Ellsworth American 
seem ed willing to consider a com prom ise on the issue, but one 
unlikely to appeal to the South. “We would not hasten to repeal 
the Personal Liberty Law, but if an arrangem ent [in which] the 
hard  features o f the Fugitive Slave Act shall be softened down, 
and that arrangem ent should call for the repeal for our law, I 
would do it at once, prom ptly and fully.”18
State Republican leaders state waited for word from President-elect Lincoln before proceeding with ques­tions of constitutionality or repeal. O n December 20, 
1860, Lincoln sent a set o f brief resolutions on the issue, through
202
MAINE’S PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS
Thurlow W eed, the alter ego of William Seward, to H annibal 
Hamlin for his consideration. Lincoln wrote that the Fugitive 
Slave Law should be enforced with certain “safeguards to lib­
erty”; that all unconstitutional state laws should be repealed, and 
that the “Federal Union m ust be preserved.”19 Unfortunately, 
these words did little to help direct policy in Maine, for while 
Lincoln showed support for the enforcem ent of the Fugitive 
Slave Law, he did not go all the way in calling for the repeal of 
personal liberty laws. He only stated that any laws in conflict with 
the Fugitive Slave Law, “if there be such,” should be repealed. 
Lincoln, obviously a m an who choose his words carefully, led 
some in the party to believe that the laws were not to be repealed.
In Maine, Union meetings held in Portland and Bangor 
reviewed the situation. Several prom inent Republicans, includ- 
ingjam es G. Blaine, William W. Thomas, and John  Neal, called 
for repeal.20 Most Republicans, however, were reluctant to yield 
to Southern pressure. In his first address to the Maine legisla­
ture, newly elected Governor Israel W ashburn took the lead in 
asking for a "candid examination of the laws of the State.” If the 
legislature found "any provisions that are in violation of the 
federal Constitution,” he pleaded, “there can be no doubt that 
they ought to be repealed.”21 But he warned the legislature, in 
strong language, that to repeal laws that were constitutional — in 
order to make concessions — would “establish a precedent of 
incalculable mischief and danger, through which would be 
wrought, at no distant period, a practical subversion of the 
Constitution, and a transfer o f the governm ent from  the hands 
of the many to the power of the few.”22
On February 13, 1861, Jam es G. Blaine, speaker of the 
Maine House of Representatives, requested that the Maine 
Suprem e Judicial C ourt review the state’s Personal Liberty laws 
to determ ine their constitutionality. W ithin two weeks the eight 
justices on the court retu rned  their opinions to the legislature. 
The results, as shown in Table I, were mixed, as the eightjustices 
presented five different opinions.
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The judges had no problem s with the constitutionality of 
requiring county attorneys to assist in the defense o f alleged 
runaways (Chapter 79, Section 20) or a similar m andate that 
prohibited statejailers from receiving and keeping fugitive slaves 
(C hapter 80, Section 37). By a majority o f five to three, the judges 
also reaffirm ed the constitutionality o f prohibiting municipal 
officials from taking cognizance o f fugitive slave cases o r aiding
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OPINIONS OF THE EIGHT JUSTICES 
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE 
STATE OF MAINE
Question: Are the relevant sections repugnant to the Con­
stitution of the United States, or in contravention of any law 
of the U nited States made in pursuance thereof?
Justice Ch 79: 20
John Tenny No
Jonas Cutting No
Richard Rice No
Seth May No
Daniel Goodenow No
John Appleton No
Edward Kent No
Woodbury Davis No
Ch 80: 37 Ch 80: 53 Ch 132: 4
No Yes Yes
No Yes Yes
No Yes Yes
No Yes No
No Yes No
No No No
No No No
No No No
Table I
in their arrest (Chapter 132, Section 4). Justices Tenny, Cutting, 
and Rice were in  the minority in this. They pointed out, in a very 
brief opinion, that justices o f the peace in Maine would not have 
jurisdiction over such a case anyway, bu t the section violated the 
clause o f the Fugitive Slave Act that required “all good citizens” 
to assist in such if their services were requested by a marshal.
O f the four Personal Liberty laws under review, the statute 
that prohibited state officials from  “aiding” a marshal in the 
capture of a fugitive slave was the strongest in purpose and 
language (Chapter 80, Section 53). Five of the justices felt that 
this section was repugnant to the Constitution; of the five,
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Justices May and Goodenow expressed their displeasure with the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850:
We regret the existence of such provisions in the federal 
constitution as constrain the highest judicial tribunal in the 
nation to decide that such a statute, with all its harshness, is 
constitutional...that a man or a woman and her posterity 
may, in effect, be made slaves forever with less legal protec­
tion and ceremony then is permitted under our state laws to 
establish title to the smallest article of property.23
Justices A ppleton and Kent com bined to write the longest of the 
five opinions, running fourteen pages. (However, over two- 
thirds o f their opinion reviewed the history o f the issue.) They 
did no t find the statute to be repugnant to the Constitution, 
writing that it should be held to be so only if “shifting uses’7 of 
some words — if state officers could be in terpreted  to be acting 
as private citizens, for example — were allowed.
Justice Davis gave the m ost rem arkable opinion o f the three 
dissenters. Jo ining A ppleton and Kent in their assessment o f this 
statute, Davis w ent further than any of the judges in expressing 
his abhorrence with the Fugitive Slave Act and with slavery.
I assume that every man is presumed to be free, and that 
slavery nowhere exists except by positive provisions of 
statute. The law of slavery is therefore bounded by the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state governments by which it 
is established. If the master voluntarily carries a slave into a 
free state, or permits him to go there, the slave thereby 
becomes free.
It follows, that, if a slave escapes into a free state, without 
the consent of the master, he also thereby becomes free 
while remaining there, and the master has no right to 
recapture him, unless there is some provision in the Consti­
tution of the United States for that purpose.24
Davis then launched an attack on Article IV, section two, 
paragraph three, of the U nited States Constitution. As the article 
did no t m ention slavery specifically it m ust be assumed, said 
Davis, that it applied to free persons. He opined:
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It does not describe a slave. A slave is not held to service or 
labor under the laws of a slave state. Those laws make him 
an article of property, to be bought and sold, like other 
chattels. And though it is said, and I have no doubt truly, that 
the framers of the constitution meant to apply this language 
to slaves, they did not use language that could properly be 
applied to slaves. There was no inadvertence, or mistake.
They meant to use language that could not be applied to 
slaves, because they believed that slavery was speedily to be 
abolished.25
It followed from  this line of argum ent that since the 
Constitution makes no m ention o f slaves or slavery, the laws that 
protected that institution were unconstitutional. While clearly 
overstepping his bounds here, Davis recognized that the Su­
prem e C ourt in  Prigg had decided that the Fugitive Slave laws did 
not violate the Constitution. In most compelling language, he 
declared it was his duty to speak against them. “No weight of 
authority, and no lapse of time, can establish that which is wrong, 
or prevent it from  ultimately being overthrow n.”26
By the first week in March 1861, the Fortieth Legisla­ture was ready to take action, based on the opinions o f the court. Motions to repeal the Personal Liberty 
laws were made in both  the Senate and the House of Represen­
tatives, although some members attem pted to delay an actual 
vote hoping that the session would end. The Senate voted to 
repeal by a vote of seventeen to ten. The House vote produced 
excitment, as Speaker Blaine came down from  his chair to plead 
for repeal. However, in a speech thought by many to be the finest 
of the session, Representative William H. McCrillis o f Bangor 
spoke for over an hour against the m otion to repeal.27 The final 
vote tallied forty-seven in favor — including all the Democrats 
present — and sixty-seven opposed.28
The split in the Maine Legislature reflects the fact that 
the issue had lost much of its partisan steam. At the time the 
legislature was voting, seven southern states had already seceded 
from  the Union; Abraham  Lincoln was three days short o f taking 
the oath o f office, and sixty-eight federal troops in a small 
pentagonal brick fort on an island near the m outh of Charleston
207
James G. Blaine. Speaker of the Maine I louse, requested a judicial review of the Personal 
Liberty laws, and in March 1N61 the Speaker pleaded before the legislature for their 
repeal. A House vote of 47 to 67 allowed them to stand. The split among Republicans 
reflected the crisis at hand: Already seven southern states had seceded, and South 
Carolina shore batteries were besieging the federal troops at Fort Sumter. Wil/n FI richer 
Johnson. LIFE OF JAMES G. EIAINE ( 1S93).
H arbor were about to run out o f supplies. The country had 
turned away from the issue o f Personal Liberty laws to confront 
the greater issues of secession and arm ed conflict. The laws were 
retained in the Maine Statutes until the passage of the T hirteenth 
am endm ent to the United States Constitution made them redun­
dant.
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